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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE CIVIL WAR IN U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: A DRESS
REHEARSAL FOR MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS

THOMAS H. LEE*

INTRODUCTION
The importance of the Civil War in the constitutional history of the United
States is universally acknowledged. Disagreement principally concerns
characterization. Does the post-bellum Constitution—including the Civil War
Amendments—represent a fundamental transformation of the preexisting
constitutional regime?1 Or is it more accurate to characterize the post-bellum
Constitution as, for the most part, the liquidation of the meaning of the
On the second view, fundamental
original, founding Constitution?2
transformation is limited to abolishing the slavery institution and its incidents.
This includes from an individual rights perspective the constitutional
guarantees of equality, due process, and the franchise; and on a structural level
recalibration of the national-state power balance.
Regardless of one’s position in this debate, it seems fair to say that all
discussion so far has been confined to the question of change and continuity in
the domestic Constitution. By “domestic” I mean the Constitution as it applies
to the regulation of: (1) relations among the three branches of the national
government in their governance of the country (separation of powers); (2)
relations between national and state governments (federalism); and (3) the
relations between the government (both national and state) and American
citizens (individual rights). The domestic focus seems justified: it was, after
all, a “civil” war.
But the American Civil War also had a significant international dimension.
The Confederate States of America claimed from the start that secession made

* Professor of Law and Director of International Studies, Fordham University School of Law.
Portions of this Article draw on my chapter with Michael D. Ramsey entitled The Prize Cases:
Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES (Christopher
H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2008).
1. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99–100 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 360,
364–65 (1981).
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them an independent sovereign nation.3 And to validate and maintain this
status, the Confederate States desperately sought official recognition by
foreign countries, international trade, and military aid and alliances, especially
with Great Britain and France.4 Conversely, it was a high priority for the
United States of America to prevent the Confederacy from achieving these
objectives. Accordingly, from the start of the war, Abraham Lincoln ordered a
naval blockade to interdict all maritime trade to southern ports despite
preexisting treaties of amity and commerce with, and the specter of military
action against, neutral foreign countries;5 and the State Department lobbied the
European powers to deny recognition of the Confederate States.6
These positions were notable departures from the general trend of U.S.
foreign policy since the founding. The United States had traditionally
championed neutrality and the free-trade rights of neutrals (even with
belligerents), refrained from threatening military action against the European
great powers, and encouraged the speedy recognition of organized rebellions in
the Western Hemisphere (typically Latin American ex-colonies).7 Whether
these settled patterns inhabited the hinterland or the heartland of what was
permissible under the Constitution, it seems at least possible that the same
debate about the Civil War’s transformative effect vel non on the domestic
Constitution might be had about the foreign affairs Constitution—the
Constitution as it regulates interactions between the United States and its
citizens on the one hand, and foreign states and citizens on the other.
Why, then, has the Civil War’s significance in the interpretation and
evolution of the foreign affairs Constitution been altogether ignored? There
are plausible reasons for the oversight. First, the foreign policy issues
implicated in the war were important but secondary to the domestic nature of
the conflict and its politics. Second, and relatedly, the Civil War’s impact on
the constitutional framework for foreign policy governance was not as
dramatic as its effect on domestic governance; there are no Civil War
Amendments in the foreign relations sphere. Third, unlike the domestic
Constitution, insights and developments in the foreign affairs Constitution
generated by the Civil War (whether we call them transformations or
liquidations) were not continuously in the spotlight in the decades immediately
after the war. Rather, they were largely forgotten as the Union dismantled its

3. See D.P. CROOK, THE NORTH, THE SOUTH, AND THE POWERS 1861–1865 (1974); DEAN
B. MAHIN, ONE WAR AT A TIME: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
WAR 19 (1999).
4. See MAHIN, supra note 3, at 17, 20.
5. Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. app. 1258 (Apr. 19, 1861).
6. See MAHIN, supra note 3, at 12.
7. See LESTER D. LANGLEY, AMERICA AND THE AMERICAS: THE UNITED STATES IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 32, 34 (1989).
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armies and fleets, turned inward to heal and westward to expand, and reverted
to the country’s comfortable habit of pacific isolationism in relation to Western
Europe.8 But the interpretations and the issues that inspired them would
reappear later in the modern history of the United States as it reengaged the
great powers and ultimately assumed a leading role in world politics.
What were these important Civil War interpretations of the foreign affairs
Constitution? This Article will explore four examples, all of which appear in
the Prize Cases9 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in March 1863 at the
midpoint of the Civil War.
But first let me explain why it is proper to focus on what seems to be an
obscure and narrow judicial decision about U.S. naval operations to illuminate
the general question of the Civil War’s impact on the U.S. constitutional law of
foreign relations. For the most part, even those legal scholars such as James
Randall, who have addressed the constitutional questions raised by the
American Civil War, have focused on the war on land, most notably on such
famous and oft-discussed matters as the Lieber Code and the Emancipation
Proclamation.10 But as historians like Stuart Bernath have implicitly
acknowledged, it was with respect to the United States’ military actions at sea
that we see most clearly how American statesmen, jurists, soldiers, and sailors
of the time thought that the Constitution constrained or empowered their
dealings with foreign nations. 11 And, of course, by contrast to the landlocked
questions, we have in the Prize Cases a real-time decision of the Supreme
Court to shed insight into their views.
The first of the four U.S. foreign relations law insights of the Prize Cases
that this Article will discuss is the notion that international law provides a basis
for the President’s exercise of military force in a manner neither specifically
enumerated in the Constitution nor preauthorized by congressional enactments.
The specific military action was the proclamation of a naval blockade that
applied not only to active Confederate belligerents but also to loyal U.S.
citizens residing in seceding or soon-to-secede states and to foreign neutral
citizens.12 The second insight is the notion that federal constitutional law
protections for U.S. citizens, such as the Fifth Amendment prohibition on the
taking of private property, may be displaced by the international laws of war
even in a category of conflict—civil war—not seemingly governed by
international law and with respect to noncombatant U.S. citizens who claimed

8. See MAHIN, supra note 3, at 12.
9. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
10. See J.G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed., Peter Smith
1963) (1926).
11. See STUART L. BERNATH, SQUALL ACROSS THE ATLANTIC: AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
PRIZE CASES AND DIPLOMACY (1970).
12. Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. app. 1258 (Apr. 19, 1861).
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to be loyal. The third is the idea that the President may, consistent with the
Constitution, unilaterally disregard or suspend the operation of on-point
provisions in peacetime treaties in times of war, such as suspending—by the
proclamation of blockade—terms in treaties of amity and commerce
committing the United States to allow the merchant ships of its treaty partners
free entry to its ports. The fourth is the role of judicial deference to the
Executive in its interpretations of international law, both treaties and the
customary international laws of war, particularly with respect to executive
interpretations that appear to “push the envelope” in terms of what might be
viewed as permissible under the prevailing rules of the laws of war. This
Article will address each in turn after a short description of the facts and legal
issues in the Prize Cases.
I. THE PRIZE CASES
On April 19, 1861, exactly one week after Confederate troops opened fire
on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, Abraham Lincoln
proclaimed a blockade of ports in the seven southern states that had already
seceded.13 The operative language in the proclamation sounds evasive.
Lincoln stated that he “deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the
ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States
and of the law of nations in such case provided.”14 Lincoln’s proclamation
also explicitly referenced an April 17, 1861 proclamation issued by the
Confederate President Jefferson Davis inviting “all those who may desire” to
apply for letters of marque and reprisal to attack Union shipping.15 Lincoln’s
reference to Davis’s prior “threat[] to grant pretended letters of marque . . . to
commit assaults on . . . good citizens of the country lawfully engaged in
commerce on the high seas”16 was important from a laws-of-war perspective,
as it might be used to justify his own proclamations of blockade as a
reciprocal reprisal. On April 27, 1861, using identical language, Lincoln
extended the blockade to the ports of Virginia and North Carolina in light of
the imminent secession of those states.17

13. Id. The seven states were South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas. Id.
14. Id. at 1259.
15. Id. at 1258–59 (referencing Jefferson Davis, By the President of the Confederate States:
A Proclamation (Apr. 17, 1861), reprinted in 1 THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF JEFFERSON
DAVIS AND THE CONFEDERACY INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, 1861–1865, at 60,
61 (James D. Richardson ed., Chelsea House-Robert Hector Publishers 1966) (1905)).
16. Id.
17. Proclamation No. 5, 12 Stat. app. 1259 (Apr. 27, 1861).
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Congress was recessed at the time of Lincoln’s blockade proclamations.18
When it reconvened without delegations from the seceded states in a special
month-long summer session starting July 4, 1861, it was dominated by
Northerners.19 Within a week, this Congress passed resolutions granting the
President the prospective power to declare parts of the country in
“insurrection” and to proscribe commerce to and from such parts.20 Congress
also debated a proposal to ratify all of Lincoln’s unilateral wartime measures:
an April 15 request for 75,000 militiamen from state governors;21 a May 3 call
for 42,000 federal volunteers;22 the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maryland in reaction to pro-secession riots in Baltimore in April;23 and the
April 19 and 27 blockade proclamations.24 It was Lincoln’s suspension of
habeas corpus that excited the most heated exchanges in the national
Legislature. For reasons that remain obscure, Congress did not enact a specific
statute ratifying Lincoln’s measures but rather approved them in a roundabout
rider tacked onto a statute increasing pay for federal troops.25 The provision
stated that “all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President . . .
respecting the army and navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to
the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved and in all
respects legalized.”26
Although Lincoln did not authorize significant military action on land until
Congress convened, the Navy moved to enforce the blockade immediately.
The Prize Cases concerned the U.S. Navy’s capture of four cargo-bearing
merchant ships between May 17 and July 10, 1861, 27 prior to Congress’s July
13 and August 6 statutes approving the President’s military actions. Two of
the ships, the Amy Warwick and the Crenshaw, were owned by United States
citizens who lived in Virginia but swore loyalty to the Union—an allegiance

18. See RONALD C. WHITE, JR., THE ELOQUENT PRESIDENT: A PORTRAIT OF LINCOLN
THROUGH HIS WORDS 104 (2005).
19. See id. at 112; 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, TREATIES, AND PROCLAMATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 255 (George P. Sanger ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1863)
(explaining that the President called a session of Congress to begin on July 4, 1861).
20. Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 3, §§ 5–6, 12 Stat. 255, 257.
21. Proclamation No. 3, 12 Stat. app. 1258 (Apr. 15, 1861).
22. Proclamation No. 6, 12 Stat. app. 1260 (May 3, 1861).
23. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
25 (1998).
24. Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. app. 1258 (Apr. 19, 1861); Proclamation No. 5, 12 Stat.
app. 1259 (Apr. 27, 1861).
25. Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326, 326 (“An Act to increase the Pay of the
Privates in the Regular Army and in the Volunteers in the Service of the United States, and for
other purposes.”).
26. Id.
27. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 636–39 (1863).
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the Government did not question.28 The Crenshaw was captured leaving
Richmond for Great Britain with a cargo of tobacco owned mostly by
Virginians on May 17, 1861.29 The Amy Warwick was captured with a cargo
of coffee owned by U.S. citizens in Virginia on July 10, 1861, en route to
Virginia from Rio de Janeiro.30 The other two merchant ships were owned by
private foreigners from neutral countries—the Hiawatha by a British subject
and the Brilliante by a Mexican citizen.31 The Hiawatha was captured on May
20, 1861, leaving Richmond for Great Britain with a cargo of tobacco owned
by British and Virginian interests.32 The Brilliante was captured anchored in
Biloxi Bay on June 23, 1861.33 The U.S. Government argued that the ship was
preparing to breach the blockade outward to Mexico from New Orleans with a
cargo of flour owned by Mexicans.34 Upon capture, all four ships were sailed
into Union ports and “condemned” in actions before federal district judges
acting as prize courts.35
The ship and cargo owners made several arguments in the federal courts
against the legality of the condemnations of their property. First, the Virginian
ship and cargo owners of the U.S.-flagged Amy Warwick and Crenshaw
asserted that, as loyal citizens of the United States, the taking of their property
was not governed by the international laws of war permitting capture of
enemies’ property at sea, but rather by the Fifth Amendment.36 Second, the
Crenshaw claimants—along with the British and Virginian Hiawatha
claimants—argued inadequate notice, their respective captures on May 17 and
May 20 off the coast of Virginia having come very shortly after Lincoln’s
April 27 proclamation of blockade.37 Both of these arguments implicitly
presumed the validity of the blockade under international and domestic law but
sought to craft an equitable exception. The third argument was made by the
Mexican owners of the Brilliante and her cargo of flour—represented by
Washington, D.C. lawyer James Carlisle.38 The Brilliante claimants directly
contested the very validity of the blockade itself by asserting that the
circumstances of the rebellion at the relevant time did not constitute a “state of
war” under international law, that the President did not have the power to

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See id. at 637–38, 651.
See id. at 637; ROBERT BRUCE MURRAY, LEGAL CASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 4 (2003).
See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 637; MURRAY, supra note 29, at 6.
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 638.
See id.; MURRAY, supra note 29, at 5–6.
See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 638–39; MURRAY, supra note 29, at 4.
See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 638–40, 678–80.
See id. at 636–37; MADELINE RUSSELL ROBINTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERS
OF THE NEW YORK PRIZE COURT, 1861–1865, at 49–50 (1945).
36. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671–74.
37. See id. at 637–38.
38. See id. at 639.
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declare the blockade under U.S. constitutional law, and that the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo committed the United States to allowing free trade
between all Mexican and U.S. ports, including those in the seceded states.39
Carlisle also argued that the Brilliante had no intent to run the blockade.40
All the owners lost in the district courts and appealed.41 The Supreme
Court consolidated the four cases for argument in February 1863.42 In a 5-4
decision published the next month, the Court upheld the specific captures and,
more importantly, the general legality of the blockade.43 Justice Robert Grier
wrote the majority opinion in favor of the Government;44 Justice Samuel
Nelson wrote a dissent for himself and three other justices including Chief
Justice Roger Taney.45
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE SOURCE OF THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO
DECLARE A BLOCKADE
A “blockade” is the use of armed force to prohibit seaborne passage to and
from the ports and coasts belonging to the enemy. The land-based analogue is
a siege. Under the contemporaneous laws of war, just as one country could not
lay siege to the cities of another with its armies unless the two were at war with
each other, the customs of the time held that one country’s navies could not
blockade the ports of another unless they were in a “state of war.”46 Even then,
just as it might be argued that humanitarian customs and morality required
besieging armies to permit the passage of food and medical supplies, the laws
of war at sea recognized that a blockade was technically limited to the
interdiction of cargo of military value to the enemy, which was called
“contraband.”47
Any ship seeking to “run” the blockade by evading the naval forces
enforcing it could be captured and condemned in a prize court along with its
cargo so long as the ship’s owners or crew had notice of the existence of the
blockade.48 Cargo owners were liable to have their cargo condemned if they
had notice of the blockade and of the ship’s intent to run it. In theory, a
merchantman carrying non-contraband cargo of no military value could declare

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 641–50; MURRAY, supra note 29, at 7–9.
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 639–40.
Id. at 637.
MURRAY, supra note 29, at 6–7.
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671, 674–82.
Id. at 665–82.
Id. at 682–99.
See id. at 665–66.
See John B. Hattendorf, Maritime Conflict, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON
WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 98, 106 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994).
48. See 1 CARLTON SAVAGE, POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD MARITIME
COMMERCE IN WAR 87–88 (1934).
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its presence to the blockading squadron, submit to search, and be allowed to
pass once the non-military nature of its mission was verified. But the breadth
with which the blockading force could define “contraband” under the
international maritime law of the time,49 coupled with the doctrine of
“contamination” (anything of military value onboard rendered the entire cargo
condemnable),50 meant that this was not a promising tack. And so in practical
terms, the proclamation of a blockade entailed the complete stoppage of
maritime trade to the blockaded enemy.
The antebellum United States, as a perennial neutral heavily reliant on
maritime trade, had been the most vocal among the Eurocentric community of
nations in advocating rules of international law circumscribing as much as
possible the belligerent rights to blockade and its incidents.51 The normative
appeal of the ideology of free trade was particularly strong among the liberal
democracies of the mid-nineteenth century.52 This gave the Americans an
ideological high ground in pushing their self-interested position. The “state of
war” requirement meant that a country could not lawfully block international
trade to another country absent war between the two countries, which was to
be signified by a declaration of war by the country seeking to blockade. It
could, without declaring war, pass municipal embargo legislation, but that
would act only to cut off trade to the other country by the nation’s own
citizens. The possibility that the necessary “state of war” under international
law might be triggered by something other than a declaration of war by the
governance institution authorized to declare war under a country’s municipal
constitution was a key issue in the Prize Cases.53
But as the current blockade rule illustrates54 and as might be inferred by
reference to the municipal analogue of embargo, one could claim that the
power to order the stoppage of trade with another country, even by deployment
of naval forces, is not necessarily a “war” power. It was international law that
made it a war power, and no judge or litigant in the Prize Cases questioned the
relevance of the international law rule, for instance, by asserting that the

49. Interestingly, the Navy Department never issued a list of contraband items during the
War. The Treasury Department prepared a list in May 1862 to guide its customs collectors. Id. at
91–92.
50. See The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28, 37–38 (1866) (citing The Maria, (1805) 165
Eng. Rep. 901 (H. Ct. Adm.)).
51. See Hattendorf, supra note 47, at 107–09; SAVAGE, supra note 48, at 44–47.
52. See Hattendorf, supra note 47, at 109.
53. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666–71 (1863).
54. A “state of war” may not be a strict requirement of blockade at customary international
law today, as demonstrated by the U.S. Navy’s “quarantine” of Cuba during the Cuban Missile
Crisis—a military operation that, in practical terms, was indistinguishable from blockade.
Contemporary treaty law also presumptively authorizes the United Nations Security Council to
order a blockade even in the absence of war. See U.N. Charter art. 42.
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President could—or could not—proclaim the blockade regardless of whether
or not the insurrection was itself a “war” in a qualifying sense under
international law. Thus one might say that for the Court, international law
defined and enhanced the scope of presidential war power. If so, that might
suggest the case as precedent for the proposition that international law can
restrict the scope of presidential war power as well.55
There were two reasons why Lincoln’s decision to declare a blockade was
viewed at the time as problematic.56 First, Lincoln’s act of deploying a
concept (blockade) from the international laws of war as they applied among
independent sovereign states could be used by foreign nations as support for
recognizing the Confederacy as an independent nation. It is worth recalling
that a principal basis on which the French during the Revolutionary War
justified recognition of the independent United States by “treating” with its
commissioners in 1778 was that Great Britain had applied the laws of war to
its conflict with its former colonies (albeit somewhat selectively) to include
cartel agreements for the exchange of prisoners of war, armistices, and
negotiated surrenders.57 Indeed, it seems fair to say that by 1861 the law of
nations had evolved to this more positivist principle of state recognition which,
at the very least, had been the United States’ customary position, such as
regarding revolutionary republics in Latin America prior to the Civil War.58 If
Great Britain and France were to recognize the Confederate States as an
independent country, then they might be more inclined to give them military
and economic assistance in their conflict with the Union.
The main alternative principle of state recognition under international law,
in the mid-nineteenth century championed unsurprisingly by monarchies
seeking to rein in domestic secessionist movements (e.g., Austria-Hungary,
Spain), would have required the parent country formally to renounce its
sovereignty over a seceding state or states before recognizing the latter’s
membership in the community of nations. This was the British position in the
American Revolutionary War, 59 although Great Britain had earlier indicated a

55. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 362–67
(2007) (suggesting that, under the Constitution’s original understanding, international law limited
presidential power through the Take Care Clause); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and
Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV.
61 (2007) (suggesting that modern courts take international law into account in defining
presidential powers).
56. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 351 (2005).
57. See HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA;
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, 1842, at 290–92 (New York,
Gould, Banks & Co. 1845).
58. See SAVAGE, supra note 48, at 42–44.
59. See WHEATON, supra note 57, at 291–92.
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contrary view in its prompt recognition of the validity of the Netherlands’
secession from Spain. But it had never been the American position on the
international law of recognition prior to the Civil War, and by the midnineteenth century, although perhaps not retired altogether by desuetude, it was
a distinct minority view among the great powers and perceived as reactionary
and quaint.
In view of the high recognition risk involved in declaring a blockade,
Lincoln considered but ultimately dismissed two other options. He might have
opted not to have restricted international maritime trade to the Confederacy at
all, contenting himself with a national embargo to cut off all interstate trade
whether by land or water. Given the laughable state of the United States Navy
in April 1861 (it had seventy-six seagoing vessels),60 this might have struck
some as the only realistic option. But the nature of the Confederate economy
rendered this an unattractive course from the perspective of military strategy.
Even as the broad expanse of the seceded states rendered invasion by land
forces a daunting prospect, the South was heavily agrarian with little
indigenous industry. It would need to export its agricultural products, most
notably cotton and tobacco, and to import war material, manufactures, and
industrial goods, in order to fight for and maintain its independence. To be
sure, the cutoff of access to northern goods and manufactures was no small
blow to the Confederate economy, but it would not suffice to strangle the
South’s livelihood, particularly in the event of a long and drawn-out war.
A more attractive option was to declare a closure of the key ports in the
southern states. Port closures were effected by municipal action only, for
instance in cases of quarantine because of infectious disease, and so they did
not have the same international law recognition ramifications as a blockade.61
But by the same token, a foreign ship and its cargo that entered a “closed” port
could not be punished or condemned under international law.62 (An American
ship could be punished if the closure was supplemented by an embargo.)
Additionally, a closure was limited merely to the issue of access to the port,
and so it could only be effective if it could be enforced by the local authorities
both by land (the docks, piers, etc.) and on water. But with the exception of
New Orleans, the United States would not have the land forces to close any of
the main southern ports until the very end of the war.63 And so, in practical
terms, a closure of the southern ports was not a real option.
The second reason why blockade was a particularly sensitive exercise of
military force was because it was directed in large part at neutral nations and
not just the enemy. To be sure, the objective was to deny the enemy access to

60.
61.
62.
63.

See GOODWIN, supra note 56, at 672.
See BERNATH, supra note 11, at 19.
See MAHIN, supra note 3, at 53.
See id. at 172–73.
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supplies and the benefits of trade, but the means of doing so entailed cutting
off the prerogative of peaceful neutral nations to engage in free trade.
Moreover, in some instances the prerogative was explicitly guaranteed by the
terms of bilateral treaties of amity and commerce between the blockading
nation and the neutral at issue. A good example was the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo with Mexico, which had ended the Mexican-American War.64
This aspect of blockade—infringing as it did upon the default rights of
neutrals at classical international law—bore more than a passing resemblance
to the issue of belligerent rights to transit neutral waters or territory under the
doctrine of “innocent passage.”65 Just as in proclaiming a blockade a
belligerent encroaches upon the treaty and law-of-nations rights of a neutral to
trade, in demanding (as opposed to requesting) passage through a neutral’s
waters or territory a belligerent trespasses upon the international legal rights of
the neutral to command and control its sovereign territory.66 Indeed, it was this
very issue of Germany’s belligerent transit through neutral Belgium that was
the formal legal reason that brought Great Britain into the First World War on
France’s side. From the United States’ perspective in the Civil War, these
same two powers were the neutrals whose default rights were being infringed
upon by Lincoln’s proclamation of a blockade.
Nor, despite Lincoln’s reference to the “pursuance of the laws of the
United States” in his proclamations, 67 was a blockade of the sort he ordered
authorized by any Congressional statute. Yes, there were venerable statutes on
the books (from 1795 and 1807) that authorized the President to respond with
armed force against enemies, foreign or domestic, who might invade or incite
insurrection. 68 And it could be argued that, under the Commander-in-Chief
Clause of the Constitution, the President might be justified in taking defensive
actions against foreign invaders and domestic insurrectionists, even without the
enabling statutes.
But because Lincoln’s blockade also deployed armed force against foreign
neutrals and presumptively loyal Americans, it was clear that these statutes or a
purely defensive constitutional war power would not suffice to authorize such
a patently offensive use of armed force. In other words if Lincoln had
proclaimed a blockade of the southern ports that would only apply to vessels
flying the Confederate flag, the United States flag, or the flags of any foreign
64. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, U.S.Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.
65. See The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 139–43 (1812).
66. Id. at 140–41.
67. Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. app. 1258, 1259 (Apr. 19, 1861).
68. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (referencing Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch.
39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006)) and Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36,
1 Stat. 424 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006))); see Stephen I. Vladeck,
Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 161–66 (2004).
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allies of the Confederates, then the preexisting statutes or constitutional power
would have sufficed. But the proclamation of blockade was acutely sensitive
precisely because a principal target of the use of naval force was the private
citizens of powerful neutral countries that the United States desired to prevent
from becoming Confederate allies.69 And, from the perspectives of Great
Britain and France, the proclamation of blockade could only appear to be an
offensive act of military force, since they had neither invaded the United States
nor actively encouraged the Confederate insurrection.
In summary, by proclaiming the blockade in April 1861, Lincoln had
committed a belligerent act that was unauthorized by the explicit words of the
Constitution and unauthorized by congressional statutes. Nor could the act be
grounded in some defensive gloss on his power as Commander in Chief, in
light of the patently offensive use of armed force on the private citizens of
neutral foreign countries that had neither invaded the United States nor actively
aided insurrection. The proclamation carried with it not only the cost of
offending those powerful neutral nations, but also the risk that they would
characterize the invocation of the laws of war by the Union against the
Confederacy as evidence in support of recognition of the Confederacy as a new
independent member of the community of nations.
To mitigate the possibility of recognition blowback, Lincoln and his
advisers articulated the theory that it was possible for the United States to
exercise belligerent rights against the Confederacy without surrendering any
claims to sovereignty rights.70 This splitting of the bundle of international
legal rights was something the founding Americans had ridiculed when the
British had made the same point during the Revolutionary War. The British,
on the occasions where they had afforded Americans laws-of-war
accommodations, cast their compliance with those laws as a matter of policy
grace, not international legal compulsion. Lincoln’s invocation in this instance
was importantly different, however, because he sought by invoking belligerent
rights to implement more severe, not kinder, measures against rebels.
III. THE “PREEMPTION” OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS OF THE U.S.
CITIZEN CLAIMANTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR
The Crenshaw and the Amy Warwick had been flying the United States
flag when they were captured.71 Both ships were owned by U.S. citizens who
resided in Virginia but who claimed loyalty to the Union, a claim that the
Government’s lawyers did not challenge before the Supreme Court.72 The

69. See MAHIN, supra note 3, at 13–14 (indicating that “a foreign war was the last thing
Lincoln and Seward wanted while they were engaged in a great civil war at home”).
70. See BERNATH, supra note 11, at 19.
71. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 637, 680.
72. See id. at 637, 651, 680.
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Crenshaw’s cargo of tobacco was mostly owned by Virginians who claimed
loyalty to the Union, as did the owners of the Amy Warwick’s cargo.73 The
Hiawatha was a British-owned ship, but a part of its cargo was owned by
Virginians who similarly alleged loyalty.74 The relevant cargo and ship
owners asserted that takings of the property of loyal U.S. citizens should be
regulated by domestic constitutional law, namely the Due Process and Takings
Clause protections of the Fifth Amendment, and not by the “enemies’
property” doctrine under the international laws of war.75 This argument
seemed particularly strong in the case of the U.S. citizen claimants in the
Crenshaw and Hiawatha cases: these ships were captured leaving Virginia
ports for Great Britain on May 17 and May 20, 1861,76 six and three days
respectively before Virginia’s citizens approved secession from the Union by
popular referendum on May 23, 1861.77
The Government’s lawyer, Richard Dana, argued in response that it was
universally accepted under the international laws of war that enemy property
could be seized, even if the individual owners were not taking part in hostilities
(or even opposing them).78 He asserted, without any direct support, that the
same rule should apply in “internal wars.”79 The Government’s position
masked a major problem: in an “internal” war, by contrast to a foreign war,
loyal citizens of a national government who happened to reside in so-called
“enemy” states seeking secession could plausibly claim the protections of not
only international law but also the nation’s domestic constitution with respect
to takings of their private property by governmental force. In other words, the
Government assumed—without bothering to justify the assumption—that in a
war of domestic complexion implicating the rights of U.S. citizens, the
international laws of war displaced (or allowed the President to displace) rules
of domestic constitutional law that would have regulated the subject during
peacetime, at least insofar as such rules applied to states in secession. This
was in essence Lincoln’s legal argument justifying the Emancipation
Proclamation, announced only a few weeks prior to the oral arguments in the
Prize Cases.80 Its premise also seems to contradict the U.S. government’s
antebellum interpretation of the laws of war to incorporate the customary
principle that no private property—enemy or neutral—should be subject to
condemnation in war.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
(1988).
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 637, 680.
See id. at 638, 676.
See id. at 674–82.
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 637–38.
See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 280
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 650–51.
Id. at 654–56.
Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. app. 1268 (Jan. 1, 1863).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

66

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:53

The Court concluded, however, that the U.S. claimants’ assertion “that the
Constitution and Laws of the United States are still operative over persons in
all the States” rested on two dubious propositions “without foundation on the
established law of nations.”81 First, it was not true that just because a civil war
exists, “the party belligerent claiming to be sovereign” can only exercise
domestic sovereign rights and not any belligerent’s rights (including the right
of capture of enemy property) over the other party.82 By contrast, the Court
asserted that “it is a proposition never doubted, that the belligerent party who
claims to be sovereign [the United States], may exercise both belligerent and
sovereign rights.”83
Second, it was also erroneous of the claimants to assert that “[w]hether
property be liable to capture as ‘enemies’ property’” in a civil war depends “on
the personal allegiance of the owner.”84 Grier adopted Dana’s underlying
assumption of total war and articulated a distinctively positivist outlook. There
was “a boundary marked by lines of bayonets, and which can be crossed only
by force—south of this line is enemies’ territory, because it is claimed and held
in possession by an organized, hostile and belligerent power.”85 Any property
belonging to any resident of that cordoned-off hostile territory, even an
allegedly loyal U.S. citizen, was liable to be treated as enemies’ property—“a
technical phrase peculiar to prize courts”—because it “may be used to increase
the revenues of the hostile power.”86 In reaching these conclusions, Grier
accepted uncritically Dana’s theory of enemies’ property without considering
the ramifications of the wholesale displacement of domestic constitutional law
protections for residents of the rebellious states (including potential union
loyalists) by the international laws of war.
IV. CUSTOMARY LAWS-OF-WAR PREEMPTION OF TREATIES OF AMITY AND
COMMERCE
One of the arguments made by James Carlisle on behalf of the Brilliante
claimants posited a tension between Lincoln’s proclamation of blockade and a
preexisting treaty ratified by the United States.87 Carlisle implied that Article
17 of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848 revived an 1831 Treaty of
Amity and Commerce between United States and Mexico that opened the ports

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 672–73.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id. at 674.
Id.
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 674.
See id. at 643–44.
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of the two countries to mutual commerce.88 That treaty commitment,
according to Carlisle, was not “suspended or abrogated by Act of Congress” or
“in any degree disturbed by the National Legislature.”89 In other words,
Carlisle suggested that a treaty ratified by the President with senatorial advice
and consent supplied an on-point rule that the Mexican ship Brilliante could
take its Mexican-owned flour from New Orleans to Mexico, and that rule could
not be “suspended or abrogated” by a later-in-time presidential proclamation of
blockade in the absence of explicit congressional authorization.90
Interestingly, the Court did not address this particular argument, although
in retrospect there were at least two plausible grounds to rebut Carlisle’s
assertion. First, one might argue that Lincoln’s proclamation of blockade
amounted to a partial termination of the earlier Treaty. As Professor Henkin
has noted, “Presidents have claimed authority, presumably under their foreign
affairs power, to act for the United States to terminate treaties . . . even in
violation of international law.”91 But the examples Henkin lists—Franklin
Roosevelt’s reactive denunciation of an extradition treaty with Greece in 1933
because of Greece’s prior failure to honor it and his denunciation of the Treaty
of Commerce, Friendship and Navigation with Japan in 193992—involved
colorable claims of reciprocal termination because of prior malfeasance on the
part of the treaty partner. No such claim could be made with respect to Mexico
under the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Moreover, in both cases the President
specifically invoked the termination power, 93 something absent in Lincoln’s
proclamations. Henkin’s third example, Jimmy Carter’s termination of the
Defense Treaty with the Republic of China in 1979, also seems inapposite,
since that termination was made with notice under the express terms of the
Treaty.94
A second possibility is that Congress did in fact abrogate the Treaty’s
open-ports provision in its post hoc ratification of Lincoln’s actions during the
1861 special session. It is commonly accepted today that a later-in-time statute
may override a prior treaty, although the key precedents so stating postdate the

88. See id. at 644 (referencing Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the
Republic of Mexico, U.S.-Mex., art. XVII, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 and Treaty of Amity,
Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Mex., art. III, Apr. 5, 1831, 8 Stat. 410).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 211–12 (2d
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1972).
92. Id. at 212.
93. See id. at 211–12.
94. See id. at 212.
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Civil War.95 If so, could it not be argued that Congress’s retroactive approval
of Lincoln’s blockade imparted upon the presidential decision the same legal
effect as a later-in-time statute? The argument is certainly plausible, but it is
interesting to note that the Court’s opinion in the Prize Cases does not make
much of the retroactive statutes in general and indicates that the point was not
necessary to its holding.96 It may be that the reason for this lack of reliance on
what would be the anchor of any modern justification of a President’s wartime
measures97 was the possibility of an ex post facto violation: to the extent that
the statutes authorized the condemnation of the property of U.S. citizens
pledging their loyalty as enemies’ property, it might be interpreted as a
violation of Article I, Section 9’s provision that no “ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”98 The majority recognized that retroactivity would “have some
weight on the trial of an indictment in a criminal Court,” but suggested that
such “precedents . . . cannot be received as authoritative” in a prize court
proceeding.99
V. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
What do the Prize Cases tell us about judicial deference to the President in
foreign relations matters? The most immediately striking aspect of the Prize
Cases is that the Court considered a constitutional challenge to the President’s
military actions during wartime and almost ruled against the President. And
this attention came despite strong arguments by the President’s counsel for
judicial abstention (including, apparently, the suggestion that deciding the
merits would make the Court an “ally of the enemy”).100 In the twentieth
century, Justice William Douglas seized on this point to assert that the Prize
Cases supplied support for a strong judicial role in monitoring presidential war
powers.101
But although the Court made a show of deciding the merits, ultimately the
majority opinion contains language of substantial deference to the Executive.
The Court was quite willing to accept the President’s characterization of the

95. See, e.g., Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Cox, 291 U.S. 138, 160
(1934); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899); Edye v. Robertson
(Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
96. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670–71 (1863).
97. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
99. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671.
100. Id. at 646.
101. E.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 1318 (1973) (Douglas, Circuit Justice)
(citing Prize Cases for the proposition that, in Vietnam War cases, “[t]he question of justiciability
does not seem substantial”).
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situation as war102 (even though at the time the blockade was proclaimed, shots
had been fired only at a single fort and no one had been killed by hostile fire).
Indeed, the majority agreed with U.S. Attorney Dana that the President’s
determination on this ground was conclusive on the Court, a point Justice
Clarence Thomas has emphasized in his dissents.103
On the other hand, notwithstanding the language of deference on the
crucial question of whether the insurrection had progressed to the level of a
full-blown civil war, the Court also referred to contemporaneous recognition of
a state of war by foreign nations, the amorphous and evolving nature of a civil
war, the disruption of the courts, and the commonsense obviousness of its
conclusion before making the point about deference.104 Indeed, one could
easily argue that the executive deference point (like the alternative rationale of
legislative ratification) was a throwaway placed late in the opinion as a nail in
the coffin. Nor, for that matter, did the Court adopt the most pro-government
position adopted by a lower court. Judge Sprague, in the federal district court
for Massachusetts, appeared to suggest that it was completely discretionary to
the Government to claim belligerent and sovereign rights as to Confederates,
and to toggle back and forth between one and the other according to what best
served its military interests.105 “The temporary non-use[] of such [sovereign]
rights [by treating rebel privateers as prisoners of war and not traitors and
pirates] is not a renunciation of them, but they may be called into practical
exercise at pleasure.”106
On the more immediate level of how the international law of prize was to
be applied to the cases at bar, however, the Court was exceedingly deferential
to the President. For instance, the owners of the Brilliante had argued that the

102. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670.
103. E.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 724–25 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
President’s findings about the nature of the present conflict with respect to members of al Qaeda
operating in Afghanistan represents a core exercise of his commander-in-chief authority that this
Court is bound to respect.” (citing Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670)); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 581 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as
Commander in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance
[as to warrant a particular measure] is a question to be decided by him.” (quoting Prize Cases, 67
U.S. at 670)); id. at 584 (“[The Court’s] deference extends to the President’s determination of all
the factual predicates necessary to conclude that a given action is appropriate.” (citing Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. at 670)); id. at 588 (“[The Court is] bound by the political branches’ determination
that the United States is at war.” (citing Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670)); see also HAROLD HONGJU
KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR 85 (1990) (finding in the Prize Cases “the Court’s hint that the president’s decisions
could be considered political questions that it ought not review”). In this respect, the Thomas and
Douglas readings of the Prize Cases decision are not easily reconcilable.
104. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 669–70.
105. See The Amy Warwick, 1 F. Cas. 799, 803 (D. Mass. 1862) (No. 341).
106. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

70

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:53

ship had been anchored in Biloxi Bay when captured, awaiting a safe conduct
to clear American waters for Mexico.107 The pass should have been granted as
a matter of course under the view of international maritime law that the United
States had held before the Civil War, since it was a private neutral vessel
carrying neutral-owned cargo to a neutral port. And the Court, as a prize court
of last resort, had the authority to examine the facts of the case de novo.
Secondly and more importantly, the majority readily accepted Dana’s
innovative theory of enemies’ property to settle the Amy Warwick and
Crenshaw cases. This acceptance came despite the absence of support on point
for extending the concept to a civil war and the significant concerns voiced by
the claimants’ counsel regarding the use of international law to displace
domestic constitutional protections for presumptively loyal U.S. citizens. The
extent of executive deference as to prize law questions in these cases stands in
stark contrast to the Court’s opinion in the famous decision in The Paquete
Habana, a case arising out of the Spanish-American War three decades later,
in which it paid no deference to the Executive’s litigating position that fishing
vessels were lawful prizes under international law.108
CONCLUSION
In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as the United States assumed a
more active role as a great—and then a super—power in world politics,
versions of the Civil War interpretations of the foreign affairs Constitution
discussed above became orthodoxy without apparent awareness of their roots.
Conservative constitutionalists, like John Yoo, have sought to validate certain
aspects of the modern transformations in U.S. foreign relations law—such as
the unilateral power of the Executive in foreign affairs—by reference to
Founding-era precedents.109 On the other hand, progressive constitutionalists,
like Harold Koh, have decried the modern, pragmatic changes in U.S. foreign
relations law, particularly the move to executive branch supremacy, as
departures from the original foreign affairs Constitution, and in tension with
bedrock constitutional principles.110 Other progressives have taken other
approaches to cast the twentieth century transformations into doubt: Sarah
Cleveland, for instance, has traced their roots to odious nativist nineteenth
century doctrines and policies dealing with marginalized groups like Native
Americans and immigrants.111 I hope to have shown here that the modern

107. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 639–40.
108. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
109. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).
110. KOH, supra note 103.
111. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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developments do have more weighty and mainstream antecedents than
progressives believe in the Civil War interpretations set forth in the Prize
Cases, but at the same time that these antecedents do not go as far as
conservatives would like in justifying executive unilateralism and a disregard
of international law.
Let me be clear about the ambiguity of what exactly the history of U.S.
foreign relations law in the Civil War reveals. It does not, for instance, show
unqualified acceptance of the shibboleth of an all-powerful, unencumbered
Executive in foreign affairs even in times of war. Nor is it clear that judicial
deference to the Executive in its interpretations of international law and other
foreign relations matters, notwithstanding their invocation, is of central
importance in the Prize Cases; it is important to grasp the context and
ramifications of such deference. And, as a general matter, it is surely relevant
that these interpretations were rendered under wartime conditions, when the
Court has historically seemed a timid institution, and were forgotten almost as
soon as they were rendered.
If the historical example of the Civil War interpretations of the foreign
affairs Constitution yields anything of value to future generations, it may be
the unanimous emphasis placed by all the major players in the Executive and
Judicial Branches on contemporaneous international law as a legitimate
referent and gap-filler in light of perceived ambiguity in the American
constitutional document on the very important legal questions at issue. What is
also clear is that, by contrast to the modern period, the state-based, warpermissive regime of international law at the time generally favored the
Executive’s interpretations which shaded to maximal use of armed force and
war prosecution. Put another way, international law seemed to allow the
President to do what U.S. constitutional law would not allow; this is different
from now, where international law is perceived as limiting what the President
might lawfully do in wartime under U.S. law alone. The underlying point may
be that those constitutionalists, generally of a progressive, peace-favoring ilk,
who support the role of international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation
should be prepared to take the bitter with the sweet and accept the possibility
that international law might support not only limitations on presidential war
powers but also expansions of it.
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